Local satisfaction can help cooperation grow in games
A study shows how adaptive aspiration levels influence how individuals change strategies on graphs.
Aspiration dynamics can favor cooperation on finite graphs. This happens through a purely local satisfaction mechanism.
Individuals compare their payoffs with adaptive aspiration levels. They then revise their strategies through a self-switching Fermi rule.
Aspiration levels are continuous and endogenous. These levels stay within the payoff interval in a compact forward-invariant state space.
In the weak-selection regime, the first-order stationary abundance shift is positive when . It is negative when .
The shift is zero when . In this equality case, higher-order terms may determine the direction.
The condition means the expected payoff of a cooperator exceeds that of a defector under neutrality.
Key facts
- The first-order stationary abundance shift is positive when .
- The stationary variance first-order correction is governed by the payoff-range contrast .
- Results hold on every finite connected graph under degree-normalized average payoffs.