Local satisfaction can help cooperation grow in games

A study shows how adaptive aspiration levels influence how individuals change strategies on graphs.

Aspiration dynamics can favor cooperation on finite graphs. This happens through a purely local satisfaction mechanism.

Individuals compare their payoffs with adaptive aspiration levels. They then revise their strategies through a self-switching Fermi rule.

Aspiration levels are continuous and endogenous. These levels stay within the payoff interval in a compact forward-invariant state space.

In the weak-selection regime, the first-order stationary abundance shift is positive when R+S>T+PR+S>T+P. It is negative when R+S<T+PR+S<T+P.

The shift is zero when R+S=T+PR+S=T+P. In this equality case, higher-order terms may determine the direction.

The condition R+S>T+PR+S>T+P means the expected payoff of a cooperator exceeds that of a defector under neutrality.

Key facts

  • The first-order stationary abundance shift is positive when R+S>T+PR+S>T+P.
  • The stationary variance first-order correction is governed by the payoff-range contrast (R−S)−(T−P)(R-S)-(T-P).
  • Results hold on every finite connected graph under degree-normalized average payoffs.

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