Testing ways to fit large security keys into VPN handshakes
No tested mechanism fully compensates for the effect of large key sizes on performance.
Post-quantum key encapsulation mechanisms carry public keys much larger than the IKEv2 protocol was designed for. The initial exchange of these public keys cannot be fragmented.
Researchers screened the IETF document corpus for protocol adjustments. They added three of their own proposals, including one using forward error correction and two using IKEv2 with QUIC.
The study used ML-KEM, FrodoKEM, and Classic McEliece. They performed 126 500 handshakes across 1296 different configurations. These tests used different bandwidths, latencies, and packet loss rates.
For Classic McEliece, no approach handles challenging conditions acceptably. These methods either congest the link or take up to nearly two minutes per handshake on average.
For ML-KEM and FrodoKEM, two ways forward exist. One requires building on standardized extensions, while the other involves delegating the transport.
QUIKE-composite offered the best overall performance. This method uses a composite key exchange to achieve a faster, more resilient handshake.
Key facts
- No mechanism fully compensates for the effect of key size on performance.
- Classic McEliece handshakes can take up to nearly two minutes on average.
- QUIKE-composite offered the best overall performance for ML-KEM and FrodoKEM.