Regulators manage hidden network risks through information and charges

New research examines how regulators choose between monitoring, certification, and audits to manage hidden network equilibria.

Aggregate outcomes can hide network configurations. These hidden configurations expose households to uninsurable risk and require different public services.

A regulator makes a joint choice between a corrective activity charge and an information institution. This study uses a two-population network game.

The regulator may use purchased Gaussian monitoring. They may also obtain signed certification or elicit a privately known state through a report backed by committed random audits.

The study characterizes the optimized values for three institutions. It identifies cost thresholds where credible disclosure replaces government monitoring.

Even when certification and truthful reporting reveal the same state, costly audits favor less specialization and a higher corrective charge.

Results depend on enforceable verification, restrictions on data access, and an explicitly limited institutional menu.

Key facts

  • Distinct specialization equilibria require different targeted interventions.
  • Costly audits favor less specialization and a higher corrective charge.
  • The institutional choice changes the optimal regulation.

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