Climate policies can help protect consumers from electricity price risks
Incomplete electricity markets can lead to inefficient risk levels for investors and consumers.
Incomplete long-term contracting in electricity markets can expose consumers and investors to inefficient levels of risk. Climate policies like renewable subsidies and carbon prices can provide an insurance co-benefit in these markets.
Researchers used a game-theoretic model to study optimal policy-making. This model anticipates how electricity market agents react to policies when gas prices and demand are uncertain. Incomplete contracting means markets lack certain long-term agreements.
Incomplete markets shift investment from renewables toward gas. This exposes consumers to uninsured risk from inter-annual volatility in electricity prices. Subsidies and carbon prices indirectly counteract these distortions by incentivizing renewable investment.
Renewable subsidies show a stronger insurance effect than carbon pricing. Carbon pricing leads to more investment in gas with carbon capture and storage and more volatile electricity prices. This can increase price volatility.
In complete markets, carbon pricing is more economically efficient than subsidies. However, incompleteness shrinks this efficiency advantage. In some cases, subsidies may become more economically efficient than carbon pricing.
Key facts
- Incomplete markets increase the optimal levels for both subsidies and carbon prices.
- Renewable subsidies provide a stronger insurance effect than carbon pricing.
- Incomplete contracting shifts investment from renewables toward gas.